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Abstract—The current trends in embedded systems are driving 
the integration of more functions in one processing element. At 
the same time, multicore architectures are increasingly used to 
improve performance, reduce costs, power consumption and size. 
Safety-critical applications are developed according to certifica-
tion standards, which, depending on the criticality level, dictate 
the development processes and certification procedures that have 
to be followed. Functions of different criticalities have to be sepa-
rated, both temporally and spatially, otherwise a low-criticality 
function can corrupt a high-criticality function. Separation is 
difficult to achieve in multicores, which leads to very high certifi-
cation costs: all the functions on a multicore have to be developed 
as if they are of highest criticality. The RECOMP (Reduced certi-
fication cost for trusted multicore platforms) project aims at re-
ducing the certification costs of mixed-criticality applications on 
multi-core platforms, and addresses several industries, including 
industrial automation, automotive and avionics. The reduction in 
certification costs is achieved through (1) the use of separation 
solutions among mixed-criticality functions, through a combina-
tion of communication infrastructure, hardware, operating sys-
tems and middleware, methods and tools and component models, 
such that the required independence is achieved; (2) reducing the 
need for tool qualification, which is very expensive, by perform-
ing a tool-chain analysis of the tools used to develop a particular 
system; (3) methods and tools which reduce development costs 
and assist the designers in the certification lifecycle. This paper 
presents the RECOMP approach to safety-critical multicore sys-
tems, with a focus on methods and tools. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Safety is a property of a system that will not endanger hu-
man life or the environment. Many safety-critical systems are 
also real-time: in a hard real-time system the “correctness of 
the system behavior depends not only on the logical results of 
the computations, but also on the physical instant at which the-
se results are produced” [1]. A hazard is a situation in which 
there is actual or potential danger to people or to the environ-
ment. Risk is a combination of the frequency or probability of a 
specified hazardous event, and its consequence. If, after per-
forming an initial hazard and risk analysis, a system is deemed 
safety-related, it has to be certified [2]. Certification is a “con-
formity of assessment” performed by a third party. The current 
certification practice is “standards-based” [3], and requires that 
prescribed certification standards be followed, depending on 
the application area. For example, IEC 61508 [4] is used in 
industrial applications, ISO 26262 [5] is for the automotive 
area, whereas DO-178B/C [6] refers to software for airborne 
systems. 
During the engineering of a safety-critical system, the haz-
ards are identified and their severity is analyzed, the risks are 
assessed and the appropriate risk control measures are intro-
duced to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. A Safety-
Integrity Level (SIL) captures the required level of risk reduc-
tion. SIL allocation is typically a manual process, which is 
done after performing hazard and risk analysis [2], but re-
searchers have proposed automatic approaches for SIL alloca-
tion. Although SILs differ slightly among areas (for example, 
the avionics area [6] uses five “Design Assurance Levels” 
(DAL), from DAL A to DAL E; in the automotive area there is 
the Automotive SIL, or ASIL), the approaches presented in this 
paper are applicable to all safety-critical areas, regardless of the 
standard. SILs are assigned to safety functions, from SIL 4 
(most critical) to SIL 0 (non-critical). 
The SIL assigned to a function will dictate the development 
processes and certification procedures that have to be followed. 
SIL 0 functions are non-critical and can be developed using 
any methods. For SIL 1, a more systematic approach is needed, 
to the level required by quality management standards such as 
ISO 9001. SIL 2 is quite similar to SIL 1, but typically involves 
more reviewing and testing. SIL 3 is significantly more diffi-
cult. Certification standards will suggest specific methods to be 
followed, and provide a checklist of techniques that are rec-
ommended to be applied. If “semi-formal” methods are ac-
ceptable in lower SILs, SIL 4 often requires formal methods, 
increasing further the difficulty and development costs associ-
ated to building safety-critical systems. SIL 4 is not possible to 
implement on a single chip due to redundancy requirements. 
Many embedded applications, following physical, modular-
ity or safety constraints, are implemented using distributed 
architectures, composed of several different types of hardware 
components (called nodes), interconnected in a network. The 
application software running on such distributed architectures 
is composed of several functions. The way the functions have 
been distributed on the architecture has evolved over time. Ini-
tially, in automotive and aerospace applications, for example, 
each function was running on a dedicated hardware node, al-
lowing the system integrators to purchase nodes implementing 
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required functions from different vendors, and to integrate 
them together into their system (this approach is also called a 
“federated architecture”). However, the number of such nodes 
in the architecture has exploded, reaching over one hundred in 
an airplane or a high-end car, leading to increased wiring, in-
creased costs, size, weight and power consumption. 
These trends have created a huge pressure to reduce the 
number of nodes, use the resources available more efficiently, 
and thus reduce costs. This is achieved through the integration 
of several functions in one node (also called an “integrated 
architecture”), see Figure 1. In addition, the nodes themselves 
can be integrated into a single chip, as is the case with the trend 
towards using multicore architectures, where several pro-
cessing cores can be integrated onto a single chip, decreasing 
the costs, power consumption, size, and increasing the perfor-
mance through parallelization [7]. The same trends are driving 
the integration of several levels of safety-criticality, together 
with non safety-critical functions. The “Research Agenda for 
Mixed-Criticality Systems” [9] defines a mixed-criticality sys-
tem as “an integrated suite of hardware, operating system and 
middleware services and application software that supports the 
execution of safety-critical, mission-critical, and non-critical 
software within a single, secure computing platform”.  
Such problems are faced in many other industries. At the 
European level, multi-cores are addressed through EU projects 
such as RECOMP (Reduced certification cost for trusted multi-
core platforms), which has the goal to “define a European 
standard reference technology for mixed- criticality multi-core 
systems supported by the European tool vendors” [10]. This 
paper highlights the approach taken by RECOMP, at the level 
of methods and tools, to reduce certification and re-certification 
costs. Section II presents the requirements from standards on 
separation, component models and methods and tools. The 
RECOMP approach is detailed in Section III, and the conclu-
sions are presented in Section IV. 
II. REQUIREMENTS FROM STANDARDS 
A. Separation Requirements from Safety Standards 
Functions of different SILs have to be separated. Other-
wise, for example, a lower-criticality function could write in 
the code or data area of a higher-criticality function, leading 
thus to a failure. The current practice to mixed-criticality sys-
tems is to physically separate the different criticality functions 
in different hardware components, so they cannot influence 
each other, see Figure 2.a. The figure shows two applications, 
A with an SIL A, and B of SIL B. The applications are running 
on top of and operating system (OS) and also, possibly, a mid-
dleware (MW). If such an approach has worked in the past, the 
advent of multicores is, however, commonly regarded as a de-
sign challenge in the safety-critical area, as there are no estab-
lished approaches to achieve certification. When several safety 
functions of different SILs share the same multicore, the stand-
ards require that the hardware and software be developed at the 
highest SIL among the SILs of the safety functions (for more 
details, see the standards), which is very expensive, see Figure 
2.b. This is because the current multicore architectures do not 
offer enough separation between the safety functions [8]. For 
example, two tasks on separate cores might compete over the 
bus for access to the memory, increasing the worst-case execu-
tion times (WCETs), on which important timing guarantees are 
based. At the same time, there is an increased need for flexibil-
ity in the systems used in the safety-critical market. This need 
for flexibility puts new requirements on the customization and 
the upgradability of both the non-safety and safety-critical part. 
However, currently, any small change in the critical or non-
critical functions, leads to an expensive recertification, at the 
highest SIL.  
Figure 2. Multicores: increased certification costs 
On a multicore, the safety functions have to be developed 
and certified at the highest SIL, unless, it can be shown that the 
implementation of the safety functions is sufficiently independ-
ent, i.e., there is both spatial and temporal separation among 
the safety functions. If the safety functions are sufficient inde-
 
Figure 1. From federated to integrated and multicore architectures 
pendent, then the certification can be done at their own indi-
vidual SIL level, and this would reduce costs, as shown in Fig-
ure 3, in Section III.A. This has to be done first by using a 
method for achieving independence (both temporal and spa-
tial), and secondly, there has to be a justification of the method. 
Section III.A discusses the approach taken in RECOMP to pro-
vide sufficient independence. 
B. Tool Requirements from Safety Standards 
Tools are becoming more and more important in current 
software and system development, and tool usage can signifi-
cantly reduce development costs, e.g., due to the automation of 
manual tasks. However, this increases also the threats that the 
tools can introduce errors into the products or fail to detect 
them. Therefore, current safety standards require analyzing the 
tools in the development and verification process. The analysis 
covers all tools and is done in three steps: 
1) Does the tool have any impact on the safety of the prod-
uct? This is true if the tool’s output is part of the product, 
or if the tool is used in some development / verification 
steps required by the standards. 
2) If the tool has such an impact, it needs to be classified. The 
classification depends on the standards. 
3) If the classification result is “critical” the tool has to be 
qualified. Qualifications can be certified. There are differ-
ent qualification methods possible, according to the stand-
ards. 
There are three important standards to be considered: DO-
178C with DO-330 for tool qualification, IEC 61508 and ISO 
26262. For example, the ISO 26262 standard has three classes 
for the tools according to the required tool confidence level 
(TCL). TCL1 means no confidence required, while TCL3 de-
notes high Confidence requirement that has to be provided by 
qualifying the tool. The computation of the tool qualification 
levels depends on an analysis of the use cases for tools that 
have impact. Tool impact TI1 means no impact, and TI2 means 
that the potential tool failures can have impact on the safety of 
the developed system. The analysis considers all potential er-
rors of the tool in the use cases and their detection (Tool error 
detection, TD) or prevention probabilities by checks and re-
strictions. These are classified as: TD 1—Tools with high de-
tection probabilities for all potential errors; TD 2—Tools with 
some medium detection probabilities for some potential errors; 
TD 3—Tools with unknown or low detection probabilities for 
some potential errors. Based on this, the tool confidence level 
according to ISO 26262 is computed according to the follow-
ing table: 
TABLE I.   DETERMINATION OF TOOL CONFIDENCE LEVEL (TCL) 
ACCORDING TO ISO 26262 [5] 
 
 
A simple example is the well-known tool make, which 
builds executable programs (and libraries) from source code, 
based on an input file called a makefile. In a general use-case, 
there is the danger of not considering some dependencies (tool 
faults or errors in makefiles), which means that the result would 
be a wrong (old) executable, which is not detectable when 
make is called without intensive analysis. Therefore make 
would have TCL 3 in such use-cases. However, if the process 
is changed a bit by requiring that make with the argument 
“clean” is executed before make is called to build the executa-
ble, then the probability of detecting non-considered dependen-
cies is high and in this case make has a reduced TCL of 1. 
Tool qualification is the next step. Only critical tools need 
to be qualified. The three main standards differ in the proposed 
qualification methods. While the IEC 61508 requires a proven 
in use argumentation, or a validation of the critical tools to be 
qualified, the ISO 26262 has the following methods selections 
available for TCL3 (and similar also for TCL2): 
TABLE II.  TOOL QUALIFICATION ACCORDING TO ISO 26262 [5] 
 
 
This table shows that the tool qualification according to 
ISO 26262 can be done in several ways; for higher tool confi-
dence levels the recommended methods are development ac-
cording to a safety standard and validation. Regardless of the 
approach taken, tool qualification is very costly, and should be 
avoided, if possible.  
Section III.B presents RECOMP’s approach to reducing 
tool qualification costs to a minimum. 
C. Component Model Requirements from Safety Standards 
To address the complexity of today’s systems, engineers 
use component-based development approaches, which encour-
age modularity and reuse. Applying component-based meth-
odology and component-based mindset during the Safety De-
velopment Life Cycle is believed to improve the reuse and 
testability of the developed system. It is expected that a com-
ponent-based methodology will help reduce the development 
as well as certification and re-certification costs, using several 
aspects in certification standards (e.g., IEC 26262) that are 
relevant to support a modular certification of the system under 
consideration (e.g., a dedicated component model or the no-
tion of a “Safety-Element out of Context”).  
There are differences among standards on this issue. In the 
avionics domain, DO-297 refers to “Integrated Modular Avi-
onics”, which provides separation among modules. In IEC 
61508 the reuse is addressed with the concept of the compli-
ance item. In this paper we will use ISO 26262 as an example. 
Thus, ISO 26262 (Part 10, Key Concepts) provides a compo-
nent model that contains several elements: Function, System, 
Component, Element, Item, Part/Units. A system is a set of 
elements, at least sensor, controller, and actuator, in relation 
with each other in accordance with a design. Note that an ele-
ment of a system can be another system at the same time. 
Components can be seen as non-system level, non-elementary, 
 
logically and technically separable elements; a component is a 
part of a system and consists of software units or hardware 
parts. An element is a system or part of a system, including 
components, hardware part, and software units. An Item can 
be seen as the system or the systems under consideration.  
Systems can be hierarchically structured and consist out of a 
set of functions. Each system is composed out of a set of com-
ponents that in turn can be hierarchically structured as well. 
Systems are elements or are composed of elements. Non-
atomic elements are components and atomic elements are ei-
ther software parts or hardware units. The ISO 26262 compo-
nent model supports a modular construction of the item under 
consideration, including suitable generic levels of abstraction 
for the corresponding elements.  
Furthermore, it supports modular certification by providing 
means for system decomposition, and corresponding construc-
tive and analytic methods of quality assurance for the specific 
type of elements, e.g. “Criteria for co-existence of different 
ASILs within the same element”, see Part 9, Clause 6 in [5]. 
A distributed and modular development of reusable ele-
ments is also supported in ISO 26262, Part 10, Clause 10 by 
the “Safety-element out of context” (SEooC). A SEooC is de-
fined as follows: a SEooC is never an item; a SEooC can either 
be a subsystem, a hardware component, or a software compo-
nent; typically, requirements at higher levels remain in the sta-
tus “assumed” (see ISO 26262, Part 8, Clause 5) and will be 
confirmed when the SEooC is used in an item development. 
The correct implementation of the assumed requirements will 
be verified during the SEooC development, but the validation 
takes place during the item development. The development of a 
SEooC starts at a certain level of requirements and design, and 
all information on requirements or design prerequisites are pre-
determined in the status “assumed”. The use of assumed safety 
goals and functional safety requirements provided by the 
SEooC leads to an ahead-construction of modularly applicable 
sub-systems that will lead to a reduction of certification costs, 
due to reuse.  
III. THE RECOMP APPROACH 
A. Sufficient Separation 
One approach, taken by other EU projects, e.g., ACROSS 
[11], is to provide such a separation at the platform level, using 
architectural mechanisms, see Figure 3.a. For example, if the 
communication on the network is predictable, e.g., using a 
time-triggered policy, each core has a particular time slot when 
it’s allowed to transmit, then the WCETs will not be affected 
by the shared network. However, semiconductor vendors oper-
ating in mass markets are unlikely to adopt and develop com-
pletely new architectures. RECOMP addresses several indus-
tries, including mass markets such as automotive and industrial 
automation, and has to deliver solutions applicable in these 
areas. The approach taken in RECOMP is to provide the sepa-
ration among mixed-criticality functions using a combination 
of communication infrastructure (“Comm.” In Figure 3.b), 
hardware (HW), operating systems (OS) and middleware 
(MW), methods and tools and component models, such that the 
required independence is achieved, see Figure 3.b. 
 
Figure 3. Multicores: two approaches to reduced certification costs  
1) The Infineon platform 
The complete description of hardware platforms developed 
in the project is available in [12]. One example platform is the 
Trusted Compute Platform (TCP), which is a development 
board designed by Infineon Technologies, AG, to support au-
tomotive and industrial applications. The board is designed to 
provide most of the conventional capability of an Automotive 
ECU such as, CAN, FlexRay and SPI networking connections, 
5V ADCs with multiple channels, and an automotive quality 
safety watchdog. In addition, it provides more established in-
dustrial interfaces such as Ethernet and USB, a robust debug 
infrastructure which supports debug not only of the “virtual 
microcontroller” but of the TCP board itself, and an LCD 
screen for more immediate feedback than in a traditional closed 
Automotive ECU. 
The main interest in the virtual microcontroller (from a 
RECOMP perspective) is the IP (see Figure 4), which has been 
enhanced to contain mechanisms developed to support the 
RECOMP requirements. The enhanced IP modules include: the 
CPU itself, main interconnect for code and data and interrupt 
infrastructure. The CPU has been modified to provide more 
support for isolation of tasks and applications. As well, the 
interconnect and all peripherals and memory modules are all 
enhanced to provide more isolation from tasks and processors, 
in addition this also provides protection against hardware 
faults. The interrupt mechanism, which supports some core-to-
core communication requirements, is also enhanced to become 
more robust against faults. The TCP will be deployed with an 
AUTOSAR [13] OS and PharOS [14], which have been ex-
tended to take advantage of this platform. The hardware plat-
form and the OS/middleware provide isolation services, thus 
supporting mixed-criticality applications. 
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Figure 4. Subset of virtual microcontroller with RECOMP  
(enhanced IP in yellow) 
2) SymTA/S analysis tool 
The complete list of methods and tools developed in the 
project, which span the whole life-cycle and address multiple 
areas, is presented in [15][16][17][18]. The deployment of 
components has an impact on certification. The configuration 
relies on synthesis tools, which generate the configuration pa-
rameters such that separation is guaranteed, in terms of func-
tionality, fault-containment and timing. Examples of configura-
tion are the decision on which time-slots to use for a given 
component, if a time-based separation is used (e.g., in the case 
of static temporal partitions), or on which core and partition to 
place a function, which is a space-based separation. Configura-
tion techniques can guarantee timing compositionality, which 
might be impossible to provide only relying on separation 
mechanisms from the platform. In our context, partitioning 
means deciding the borders of a component and/or how to 
group components into larger ones, and mapping means decid-
ing the assignment of components to the different cores of a 
multi-core system, or an assignment to time slots—
configuration decisions related to deployment. Both partition-
ing and mapping provide a way of separating the mixed-
criticality functions such that non-interference is guaranteed.  
In this context, one example tool is the SymTA/S tool [19] 
from Symtavision GmbH, which has been extended in 
RECOMP to be able to analyze different multi core configura-
tions.  Worst-case scheduling and performance analysis is used 
for to characterize the worst-case timing behavior of the soft-
ware. This provides upper bounds for the system timing. In 
reality these bounds should never be reached but the system, 
especially a safety critical one, should be designed to handle 
such worst case scenarios. The whole technology is model 
based and abstracts from details of the systems and considers 
only relevant parts for the scheduling and performance analy-
sis. It can be used for modeling and planning of upcoming sys-
tems but also for validation of already existing and finished 
systems. 
With multi cores new challenges appears for developers but 
also for the scheduling analysis. One identified issue in multi 
cores are communication overheads resulting from core cross-
communication. Communication means here the exchange of 
data between software functions running on different cores. 
This data is written by one core into a memory and is read by 
the other core from the memory. In AUTOSAR, this is covered 
by the IOC (Inter-OS-Application communication). Depending 
on the structure of the different cores and memories and also on 
the implementation of the IOC by an operating system, differ-
ent amounts of overheads are introduced. For heterogeneous 
memory structures, the overhead depends on where the data is 
stored. This could be in local fast memories for one core or in 
global shared memories connected by crossbars or other bus 
technologies. 
Industrial experience, and the experience in RECOMP, has 
shown that these overheads can get significant and the over-
head dominates the system. In RECOMP, Symtavision added 
an explicit consideration of memory access overheads to their 
SymTA/S tool. This allows to analyse how much data is ac-
cessed by which core and software function and how much 
overhead does it introduce. With this information, optimiza-
tions are possible to reduce the overhead in the system; less 
overhead means more performance and reduces bottleneck 
situation. 
B. Minimizing Tool Qualification 
The Tool Chain Analysis (TCA) [20] method has been de-
veloped and applied within the RECOMP project. It automati-
cally computes the tool confidence level (TCL) according to 
ISO 26262 and can also reduce the tool qualification level. The 
method is based on a formal model of tools, use cases, artifacts, 
potential errors, checks and restrictions etc. and an algorithm to 
compute the TCL.  Furthermore, it has an error model to sys-
tematically derive potential errors using attributes that charac-
terize the tools (black-box and white-box). An important aspect 
of the method is that it allows formalizing assumptions in order 
to express that certain checks for potential errors during the 
development process have to be applied by the developers.   
The tool chain analysis method has been implemented in a 
“Tool Chain Analyzer” software tool. The tool also contains a 
report generation feature and has a documentation explaining 
the model and features. The Tool Chain Analyzer has TCL 1 
with the assumption that the confirmation review of the TCLs 
and the qualification measures are done on the generated re-
port. Since this review is required by ISO 26262, the tool is 
uncritical and requires no further qualification.  
The tool has been applied in three large industrial projects. 
One result was a tool chain with 39 tools, which could be ex-
tended by small process extensions and some redundancy, such 
that only the qualification of one tool was necessary. Compared 
with the results of a fixed tool confidence level classification as 
proposed in literature, this has dramatically reduced the tool 
qualification costs by reducing the number of tools to be quali-
fied from 13 to 1. Therefore, the tool chain analysis method can 
substantially reduce certification costs by minimizing costly 
tool qualification. 
C. Component Models for Certification 
From a development process point of view, significant cost 
savings can be achieved by streamlining the management of the 
needed information for the certification authorities. Traceabil-
ity of information through the development cycle requires sig-
nificant effort. In order to effectively use components, they 
need to carry enough information with them in order to be use-
ful in a development process for certified safety critical sys-
tems. What information is needed is domain specific (standard 
specific) and depends on the safety integrity level of the system 
where the component will be used. Verification and validation 
is also a time and resource consuming task. Automated test 
case generation, other automated verification techniques and 
re-use of components could bring savings.  
We have surveyed the existing component models and pro-
posed a component model specification for safety-critical sys-
tems to support certification. The component model specifica-
tion has been initially developed as an extension to the compo-
nent model of AutoFocus 3 (AF3) [21]. AF3 system model is 
divided into several models that provide different levels of ab-
straction. This enables component-based modeling at the func-
tional, logical, and technical design levels. The AF3 component 
model is inspired from the Esterel language currently used in 
state-of-the-art development of safety-critical systems, and uses 
a message-based, discrete-time communication scheme as its 
core semantic model. To support a wide range of development 
processes, RECOMP is currently extending the CESAR meta-
model [22] with the essential parameters of the component 
model specification for certification. The CESAR metamodel is 
part of the ARTEMIS tool reference platform [23] addressing 
the complete development lifecycle of safety critical embedded 
systems, without focusing on certification. 
In order to use a component model specification for certifi-
cation, we have identified certain basic parameters to be asso-
ciated, with respect to the component meta-model that might be 
necessary for certification purposes. These parameters are: 
Unique ID–To ease identification within a component library; 
Version number; Name–Name of the component; Description–
Description of the functionality provided by the component; 
References to requirements fulfilled by the component; Refer-
ences to test cases–Tests applied to verify the component; Safe-
ty Integrity Level (SIL)–The SIL capability of the component; 
Functionality–Safety related–the component implements func-
tionality related to the safety function; Diagnostic–the compo-
nent implements a diagnostic function; Non-safety related–the 
functionality provided by the component is non-safety related; 
Rules/Restrictions–Specifies rules/restrictions that have to be 
followed in order to reuse the component;  
The proposed component model has been used to model an 
industrial case study (emergency stop function) from Danfoss 
Drives [15]. 
 
D. Verification and Validation vs. Certification 
Assume-guarantee methods have been used to support 
compositional verification. However, these methods are not 
applicable to certification [3], across all industrial areas. Certi-
fication for multicore architectures can use compositional veri-
fication only if separation mechanisms are provided, which 
guarantee that, if something goes wrong with a component, will 
not influence indirectly (through shared memory corruption for 
example) other components. Component validation checks the 
components in isolation, before they are put together. This is 
done offline, using testing and/or verification to determine the 
correctness of the implementation and online using runtime 
monitoring to check the separation between the safety and non 
safety-critical parts. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented the RECOMP approach to imple-
menting mixed-criticality applications on multi-core platforms 
aiming at reducing certification and re-certification costs. The 
increased certification costs are due to the nature of multicores, 
which do not provide sufficient separation among mixed-
criticality functions. Thus, the designers are forced to develop 
at the highest criticality level, which is prohibitively expensive, 
and to re-certify the system for any small upgrade, even of the 
non-critical functions. RECOMP reduces the certification costs 
by offering sufficient separation, through mechanisms at plat-
form, OS, middleware and component levels, and through the 
carefully planned use of methods and tools such that this sepa-
ration is guaranteed. In addition, the methods and tools used in 
a tool-chain to develop a particular system can be analyzed, 
such that costly tool qualifications are reduced and minimized. 
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